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THE SCOPE OF AUTHENTICATION BY SIGNATURE.
Where the law requires, as evidence of a transaction or
contract, a writing signed, or signed and witnessed, the ques-
ion often arises, just what constitutes writing which is authen-
ticated by the signature. The answer must be determined by
(i) the physical unity of the writing, (2) its rhetorical unity,
(3) oral testimony. By rhetorical unity is intended that internal
sense, coherency and consistency which characterize a complete
legal instrument.'
Of the three tests or proofs, that of rhetorical unity is essen-
tial and controlling. Mere physical juxtaposition of writings is
unavailing to effectuate them as a single writing in the absence
of rhetorical unity. In re Drummond, 2 Sw. and Tr. 8; In re
Tovey, 47 L. J. P. 63.
Oral testimony may be received in aid of rhetorical unity
(Allen v. ZH~addock, Moore, P. C. C. 427), but not to unite docu-
ments whose rhetorical structure is clearly distinct. To allow
the latter would clearly violate the so-called parol evidence
rule.
But is rhetorical unity sufficient in the absence of physical
juxtaposition? With the exceptions hereafter noted, this ques-
tion has uniformly been answered in the affirmative. It has
arisen in cases divided by the books into four classes:
I Those which hold that a memorandum in writing under
the statute of frauds may be made up of two or more documents
provided they refer to each other. 29 A. and E. Ency. Law
(2d ed.) 850.
z. Cf. Barnewell v. Murrell, I8 So. 831 (Ala.).
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2. Those which hold that a will may consist of several loose
sheets. Rood on Wills, §248.
3. Those which hold that a will may "incorporate" into itself
an extrinsic document. Rood, §251.
4. Those which hold that a codicil well executed effectuates a
will previously revoked, a will never well executed, or ineffectual
because of undue influence, or want of capacity, and that it
makes the will speak as of its own date. Rood on Wills, 396.
A noteworthy matter in connection with Bryan's Appeal, 77
Conn. 240, is its recognition of the identity of the principle
underlying classes one and three. This identity seems also to
be assumed by the court in Allen v. Maddock, ii Moore, P. C. C.,
427 (the leading English case on the subject of incorporation).
Except for the implication of the opinion in this ,last case,
Bryan's Appeal stands alone in this recognition.
The identity of the principle on which classes one and two
are based is strongly and clearly stated in Barnewell v. Murrell,
i8 So. 831 (Ala.).
Professor Chaplin, in an article on incorporation, in Volume
II of the Columbia Law Review, clearly proves the identity of
principle underlying classes three and four.
As Professor Chaplin's purpose is to show (as he clearly
does) that Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N. Y. 215, is not only
based on insufficient or misconceived authorities, but is also
inconsistent with many other decisions in New York, he con-
fines his examination of decisions to cases decided in New York.
The authorities on the subject of republication by codicil out-
side of New York make his position even clearer. They hold
that republication by codicil referring to the will validates:
(i) a will never well executed 2 ; (2) a will originally the product
of undue influence3 ; (3) a will made when the testator did not
have testamentary capacity4 ; (4) a gift made by will to a sub-
scribing witness6 ; (5) it also renders it unnecessary to prove due
execution of the will 6 : (6) effectuates unattested additions to
the will 7 ; (7) gives the will the same effect as though first
executed at the date of the execution of the codicil. 8
As to class five above, it is to be noted that an execution not
proved is no execution at all. So far as appears, there may
have been no valid attestation, the testator my have been
incapable, etc. De non apparentibus et non existentibus eadam est
ratio.
-2. Beale v. Cunningham, 3 B. Mon. (Ky.) 390; Harvey v. Chouteau, i4
Mo. 587; Burge v. Hamilton, 72 Ga. 568.
3. O'Neall v. Farr, i Rich. Law (S. C.) 8o.
4. Brown v'. Riggin, 94 Ill. 56o.
5. O'Neall v. Farr, sufra; Morfield's Will, 74 Iowa 429.
6. Hobart v. Hobart, 154 Ill. 6xo; McCurdy va. Neal, 42 N. J. Eq. 333.
7. Wikoff's Afifieal, iS Pa. St. 281; Hubbard v. H-ubbard, 198 Il1. 21.
8. Wiitings' Afieal, 67 Conn. 379; Giddings v. Giddings, 6s Conn. 149.
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It is difficult to see, and no authority points out, how any-
thing less than a full execution by a testator, free from undue
influence, and with testamentary capacity (all of such facts
being duly proved), can avail to differentiate a paper called a
will, referred to by a codicil, from any other extrinsic document
referred to in a will. In the absence of such execution, so
proved, they are on precisely the same footing.
One reason for holding rhetorical unity a sufficient test of
the scope of authentication without the additional requirement
of physical juxtaposition, stated in Jones v. ffabersham, 63 Ga.
146, i57, is the impracticability of setting any satisfactory
standard of physical unity. To hold the joining of two sheets
by tape, or by sealing wax, or by staples, etc., requisite to
satisfy the law, would be to add another technicality to a law
already sufficiently technical to furnish numerous pitfalls for
the unwary. Another reason which might be suggested is that
a requirement of physical juxtaposition under any standard,
which would be practicable, would not furnish any extraordinary
degree of protection beyond that afforded by the requirement
of rhetorical unity. Even then, blank spaces might be filled,
fastenings might be removed and papers substituted, and an
indefinite variety of frauds perpetrated. No more, if as much,
igenuity would be required to fit the papers together, so as to
give such an appearance of physical unity as would be neces-
sary to make an interpolation which would be consistent and
harmonious with the original document.
It would seem that classes two, three and four are really
identical, and that to hold a will well executed, though con-
tained on several sheets, and to give republication the effect
stated above, while repudiating the doctrine of incorporation,
is to introduce a serious inconsistency into the law.
Such an inconsistency exists in New York. Booth v. Baptist
Church, 126 N.Y. 215, decides that the doctrine of incorporation
does not obtain in New York. Yet it is held in Caulfieldv.
Sullivan, 75 N. Y. 153, that proof of a codicil which refers to a
will is sufficient proof of the will; in Cook v. White, 43 App.
Div. 388, affirmed z67 N. Y. 588, that a codicil effectuates a will
to which it refers, though the will was made without testa-
mentary capacity; in Mooers v. White, 6 Johns Ch. 36o, that a
codicil, referring to a will, validates a gift, in the will, to a sub-
scribing witness of the will; in Brown v. Clark, 77 N. Y. 309,
that a codicil referring to a revoked will revives it. See also
Re Piffard, im N. Y. 410; Re Snell, 32 Misc. N. Y. 6II; Re
Fitzgerald, 33 Misc. N. Y. 325; Re Douglass, 38 Misc. 609, which
show how narrowly Booth v. Baptist Church is constructed by the
courts of New York.
Whether the doctrine of incorporation obtains in Connecti-
cut is still uncertain. Bryan's Appeal, supra, as well as Phelps v.
Robbins, 40 Conn. 250, leaves the question undecided. To guide
the lawyer seeking light on this subject we have, on the one
hand, the strong dictum of Judge Carpenter in Phelps v. Robbins,
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that the law of Connecticut forbids incorporation, and a state-
ment in Crosby v. Mason, 32 Conn. 486, that the paper referred
to in the will there construed could be used as a means of iden-
tification, but not to make out a gift. To this is added the
acquiescence of Judge Gager (before whom Bryan's Appeal was
tried) in the doctrine of Pheji's v. Robbins. After stating that
Judge Carpenter's remarks were dicta, he says (printed record
Bryan's Appeal, P. 45):
"But the Court in that case, at some length and with some
care, expressed its opinion, upon what it conceived the law was,
and what it would be found to be if any question arose when it
was necessary to determine that specific point. And here again
it is to be noticed that the Court adopts the distinction between
descriptive and dispositive papers, and repudiates the claim
that dispositive, extraneous papers can be introduced into a will
by reference.
"Now, granting that the statements are obiter, they are yet
the formal and emphatic expression of a suggestion by our
Supreme Court as to what the law probably is upon this ques-
tion. The reasoning of Judge Carpenter comniends itself to my
judgment, and I adopt it, and hold that the admission of this
letter would override the statute already referred to."
On the other hand, we have the conflict of this position with
the great weight of authority; its inconsistency with Giddings v.
Giddings, 65 Conn. 149, and Whiting's Appeal. 67 Conn. 379,
which hold that the execution of a codicil referring to a will
gives the latter the same effect as though first executed at the
date of the codicil. and the fallacy of the attempt made in
Phelpgs v. Robbins to distinguish between dispositive and identify-
ing papers. The paper admitted by Crosby v. Mason as identify-
ing is dispositive within the standard set by Booth v. Baptist
Church, 126 N. Y. 215. To render certain and effectual a
bequest or devise, otherwise ineffectual because uncertain, is as
much to make a will by extrinsic documents as to make. out a
whole bequest by the use of such documents. Further, the cases
above cited upon the subject of republication show that the
more testamentary the extrinsic paper is, the more certain it is
to be incorporated.
The statement in Bryan's Appeal of the requirement, that
there must be a clear, explicit, unambiguous reference to a
specific document as one existing and known to the testator at
the time his will was executed, follows many of the authorities.
An examination of the cases, however, seems to show that,
while a reference to a paper as a document to come into exist-
ence in the future is insufficient, a reference to a paper in terms
which would apply equally well to a future or a past document
is sufficient, if the evidence shows that the document was exe-
cuted before the will.
Theobald on Wills, page 55, states the law as follows:
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"It has been said that the document must not only in fact
be in existence, but also that it must be described as existing.
"It would seem, however, that if the document is proved to
be in existence at the time of the will and is sufficiently identi-
fied with the description in the will, it is not necessary that it
should be actually described as in existence."
In re Truro, i P. and D. 2oi, holding that language in a will,
suficient if read in the light of the facts as they existed at the
time of the execution of a codicil, would have been insufficient
if read in the light of the facts existing at the execution of the
will; and In re Yockey, 29 L. T. 699, where the court said that
the language, unexplained by evidence as to the surrounding
circumstances, left it perfectly uncertain whether the paper was
regarded by the testator as in existence or not, but held it suffi-
cient, strongly confirms this statement.
The more accurate statement of this requirement would
seem to be that the language of reference must not point to a
future instrument. Harrison Hfewitt.
THE CONTROL OF THE COURTS OVER THE INTENT OF THE
LEGISLATURE.
When the highest court in perhaps the leading American
state boldly deserts a line of reasoning which heretofore it has
announced to be the settled doctrine in a large number of care-
fully considered cases and by the same decision overrules the
manifest intent of the legislative act passed in presumable
reliance upon those decisions, in order to secure what it con-
siders substantial justice, the decision is well worth careful
study. This the Court of Appeals of New York has done in
Griffin v. Interurban Sireet Railway Co., 72 N. E. 53, a case
relating to the imposition of cumulative penalties. In this case
the charter of the company imposed as a condition where
different street railways were consolidated, that free transfers
should be given within certain defined limits in the city of New
York. The Legislature imposed a penalty of $5o "for every
refusal" of such transfer. The plaintiff, Griffin, having been
refused transfers at four different times, brought suit for $200.
The Court, by- Bartlett, J.. after referring to People v. N. Y.
C. R. R., 13 N. Y. 78; Suydan v. Smith, 52 N. Y. 383, and
Grover v. Morris, 73 N. Y. 473, where under similar wordings
cumulative penalties had been allowed, said:
It is quite obvious that the legislative intention to permit
the recovery of cumulative penalties for refusals of the defend-
ant to comply with provisions of the Railroad Law in regard to
the transfer of passengers is as clearly manifested as in any of
the cases cited. Notwithstanding this fact, a majority of my
brethren are of the opinion that while the rule for the recovery
of cumulative penalties, as already adverted to, is firmly estab-
lished by the earlier decisions of the court, yet the changed
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conditions in our modern life in great cities render its modifica-
tion imperative. . . . The court is of the opinion that if
cumulative remedies are to be permitted, the Legislature
should state its intention in so many words; that a more
definite form of statement should be substituted for the words
hitherto deemed sufficient."
The court accordingly held that only one penalty could be
recovered, and that by bringing action on one transfer, all
similar causes of action previously acquired were waived. The
reason given for the change of policy is that actions of
this nature had become highly speculative in character, and
that well-nigh appalling losses would be inflicted upon these
and other defendants if the policy were to be continued.
The case presents itself from two points of view: that of the
doctrine of stare decisis, and that of conflict between the legisla-
tive and judicial departments of government, and in either of
these it is doubtful whether the Court of Appeals can find
decisions in support of the position it has taken. The doctrine
of stare decisis seems to be thoroughly incorporated into the
fabric of American law, and only recently has its authority
been seriously questioned. Some American courts, indeed,
have carried the doctrine to extremes, as is illustrated in Gray
v. Gray, 34 Ga. 499. There the Court says: "When a question
has once been decided in this Court we desire it to be distinctly
understood that such a decision is with us authority. We deem
it of great importance that the decisions of this Court should,
as a general rule, be uniform." And the Supreme Court of
the United States has taken a position nearly as decisive, when
a case has been uniformly decided in the same way a number of
times. Wright v. Sill, 2 Black (U. S.) 544. See also Davidson v.
Bigs, 61 Ia. 309.
Although legislative attempts to infringe upon the line
which separates the legislative from the judicial functions of
government have not been infrequent, the courts have almost
uniformly manifested great care lest they should infringe upon
the duties apportioned to the other departments. They have
always adopted as a cardinal rule the principle that when the
language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the expressed
intention of the legislature must prevail, and that the wisdom,
expediency or good faith of that body are not matters for
judicial inquiry. i Kent Com. 460, 468; Opinion of the justices,
,66 Mass. 589, 595; and the consequences are not to be consid-
ered where the language is plain and unambiguous. State v.
Franklin City S. B. & T. Co., 74 Vt. 246; Louisville & Nashville
R. R. v. Com., 104 Ky. 226.
These principles are too familiar, and the cases which sup-
port them too numerous, to need further illustration, but in
view of the decision cited, they would seem to deserve new con-
sideration, since it is not to be assumed that a court of the im-
portance of the Court of Appeals of New York rendered its
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decision without carefully considering them, even though the
points are not discussed in the decision. It is difficult to see
how the legislative intent could have been more clearly
expressed. Without doubt the losses to be sustained by the
Interurban Railway and similar corporations might be appalling
if the recovery of cumulative penalties were allowed, but it is
to be remembered that they were in this case probably incurred
in willful and deliberate violation of the law. with a full knowl-
edge of the possible consequences. Such violations have be-
come too common of late, and too often escape a punishment
sufficient to act as a deterrent from future disregard of public
rights.
Sir Henry Maine, in his notable work upon Ancient'Ldw, in
commenting upon the fact that the jurisprudence of the Greeks
left no impression upon the systems of later times, ascribes as
a reason that, as in this case, the facts were allowed to influence
and control the rigid rules of law. "No durable system of juris-
prudence," he says, "could ever be produced in this way. A
community which never hesitated to relax rules of the written
law whenever they stood in the way of an ideally perfect decis-
ion on the facts of a particular case, would only. if it bequeathed
any body of judicial principles to posterity, bequeath one con-
sisting of the ideas of right and wrong which happened to be
prevalent at the time. Such jurisprudence would contain no
framework to which the more advanced conceptions of subse-
quent ages could be fitted." It is apparent that in the United
States, owing to the vast number of state courts, every effort
should be made to bring at least the adjective law into some
semblance of uniformity, and that rules long established
should not be varied without the most powerful reasons, since
every deviation must cause a multitude of embarrassments to
the courts themselves. It is hoped that the policy of the New
York court, as evidenced in this decision, will not be followed.
THE APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVERS AT THE INSTANCE OF CREDITORS
UPON THE MERE INSOLVENCY OF A CORPORATION.
In the case of Harrigan v. Gilchrist, 99 N. W. 909, the fol-
lowing general proposition was laid down:
"Courts of equity will not, without legislative policy favor-
able thereto, manifest in some way, render a corporation inca-
pable of performing its corporate duties and practically termi-
nate its existence by sequestering its property and taking charge
of its affairs, though it is within judicial power to do so when
necessary to the ends of justice."
The last clause suggests an inquiry into the conditions under
which a court will take the property of a corporation within its
power and appoint a receiver therefor.
The two theories as to the relation existing between an
insolvent corporation and its creditors-one holding that it is a
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trust relation, the other holding it to be that ofdebtor andcred-
itor-are well known. The appointment of a redeiver for the
property of an insolvent corporation is materially affected by
the theory followed in the particular jurisdiction. If the trust
theory is followed then any creditor on establishing the insol-
vency of a corporation has a right to demand, in a court of
equity, the appointment of a trustee, or receiver, he being a
beneficiary under the trust.
The trust theory was established by Justice Story in the
case of Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 308, a decision which has
been greatly criticised and quite generally repudiated. But it
is still adhered to by the State of Washington, and a trustee, or
receiver, may there be appointed upon a showing of insolvency.
Olsen v. Bank, 15 Wash. 148; Liquor Co. v. Cafe Co., 28 Wash.
176; Conover v. Hull, io Wash. 673.
The trust theory is also adhered to by the federal courts, but
has a peculiar application, having no effect on the right of a
court of equity to appoint a receiver. The grounds for appoint-
ing a receiver in the federal courts are not materially different
from those in the state courts generally, but the trust theory is
applied to the distribution of the assets after a receiver has
been appointed. The view that the federal courts take of the
trust theory is well discussed in Gallagher v. Asphalt Co., 55
Atl. 259.
By the great weight of authority, the relation between a
corporation and its creditors is simply that of debtor and
creditor. A corporation, although insolvent, holds its property
as an insolvent natural person does, and its assets are not a
trust fund for the benefit of creditors in any proper sense.
3 Clark & Marshall, Corporations, 2319; Marshall, Corporations,
1026.
In jurisdictions where the trust fund theory has been
repudiated, and in those also where it is accepted but not as
affecting the right of a court of equity to appoint receivers, a
court has no power to appoint a receiver of the property of any
corporation, whether domestic or foreign, upon the mere filing
of a bill by a creditor-at-large on behalf of himself and of all
others similarly situated. Lehigh Coal Co. v. Central R. R., 43
Hun 546. Before a court of equity will appoint a receiver at the
instance of a creditor, he must have reduced his claim to judg-
ment and have an execution returned nulla bona. Brown v.
Lake Superior Iron Co., 134 U. S. 530; Dodge v. Pyrolusite Man-
ganese Co., 69 Ga. 665. Mere insolvency is not a sufficient
ground for the appointment of a receiver where there is no
charge of fraud, mismanagement, or wasting of assets. Law-
rence, etc., Co. v. Rockbridge Co., 47 Fed. 755; Dambman v. Empire
Aill, 12 Barb. 341. A court of equity may appoint a receiver
for the property of a corporation, or for specific property, upon
suit of a creditor holding a lien thereon when there is imminent
danger of the property being wasted, lost, or misapplied.
Cheever v. Rutland, etc., R. Co., 30 Vt. 653; Haas v. Chicago
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Building Soc., 89 Ill. 498. A creditor is entitled to the appoint-
ment of a receiver when the corporation has ceased to act, and
the principal stock-holders are fraudulently dealing with the
property as their own. Conro v. Gray, 4 How. Pr. (N. Y.) i66.
By the laws of Texas a receiver may be appointed for an
insolvent corporation, though the creditor asking for the
receiver has not reduced his claim to judgment. San Antonio &
G. S. R. Co. v. Davis, 30 S. W. 693. A number of the other
states have passed statutes regulating the appointment of
receivers. The effect of many of these is to bring about the
same result as though the trust fund theory had been adhered
to-namely, the appointment of a receiver upon mere insol-
vency.
Valuable illustrations of the appointment of receivers over
corporations are given in 3 Por. Eq. Jur. 363, note 5, and cases
cited.
